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Volume 1956 April 1956 Number 2
THE LAW OF PERSONS IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN
CONFLICT OF LAWS
HAROLD G. WRENt
On March 31, 1954, the United States and Japan celebrated the
one hundredth anniversary of the signing of a "Treaty of Peace,
Amity and Commerce"1 between their respective sovereignties. Since
the signing of the original treaty in 1854, there have been many
treaties, conventions, and executive agreements affecting the status
of nationals of the two countries.2
t Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaties, Conventions, Inter-
national Aos, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America
and Other Powers, 1776-1909, S. Do¢. No. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 996 (1910).
2. The following is a complete list of treaties, conventions, and executive agree-
ments between the United States and Japan:
Treaty
Peace, Amity and Commerce
Commercial and Consular
Commerce and Navigation
Reduction of Import Duties
Shimonoseki Indemnities
Tariff of Duties
Commercial
Reimbursing Shipwreck Expenses
Extradition
Commerce and Navigation
Protocol
Patents, Trade Marks & Designs
Copyright
Extradition, Supplemental
Arbitration
Trade Marks in China
Trade Marks in Korea
Exchange of Notes Declaring Policy
in the Far East
Commerce and Navigation
Convention for the Protection of Fur
Seals
Protocol between Consular Officials re
Abolition of Foreign Settlements in
Korea
Extension of Arbitration Convention
Exchange of Notes re China
Extension of Arbitration Convention
Signed
March 31, 1854
June 17, 1857
July 29, 1858
January 28, 1864
October 22, 1864
June 25, 1866
July 25, 1878
May 17, 1880
April 29, 1886
November 22, 1894
November 22, 1894
January 13, 1897
November 10, 1905
May 17, 1907
May 5, 1908
May 19, 1908
May 19, 1908
November 30, 1908
February 21, 1911
July 7, 1911
April 21, 1913
June 28, 1913
November 2, 1917
August 23, 1918
Proclaimed
June 22, 1855
June 30, 1858
May 23, 1860
April 9, 1886
April 9, 1886
April 8, 1879
October 3, 1881
November 3, 1886
March 21, 1895
March 9, 1897
May 17, 1906
September 26, 1907
September 1, 1908
August 11, 1908
April 5, 1911
May 26, 1914
February 25, 1919
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Treaty of 1854, concluded after long and arduous negotiations
between Commodore Perry and Hayashi Daigaku-no-kami, Prince Ido,
Prince Izawa, and Udono, was the wedge opening the door of Japan
that had remained closed since 1607. It opened the ports of Shimoda
and Hakodate for trade between the two countries, provided for the
treatment of shipwrecked persons, granted the United States most-
favored-nation privileges, and provided for the establishment of a
consulate at Shimoda. Article IV of the treaty provided that "citizens
of the United States in Japan shall be amenable to just laws." Follow-
ing the appointment of Townsend Harris as the first American Con-
sul General to Japan, additional concessions were obtained in 1857.
The United States was granted rights of extraterritoriality as to crim-
inal cases, and the port of Nagasaki was opened for trade.
In the following year, a more detailed treaty was concluded. By
the terms of this treaty, the jurisdiction of the consular court was
extended to include civil cases instituted by Japanese citizens against
Americans, as well as criminal jurisdiction over American citizens.
Japanese courts were opened to American citizens to prosecute claims
against the Japanese. Additional ports were opened at Kanagawa,
Niigata, and Hyogo. Six months after the opening of Kanagawa, the
port of Shimoda was to be closed to Americans. Trade between the
United States and Japan was to be governed by a series of trade
regulations appended to the treaty.
During the Civil War in America, contacts between Japan and the
United States disappeared for all practical purposes. Japan was
undergoing an internal revolution resulting in the restoration of the
de facto power of government to the Emperor Meiji. Several treaties
and conventions concerning commercial matters were concluded be-
tween the two governments, but they were ultimately superseded by
the "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" of 1894, which took as its
model a similar treaty which England had concluded with Japan.
Extraterritoriality and foreign settlements were abolished, most-
favored-nation privileges were mutually extended, and the citizens
of the contracting parties resident in each other's territory were
Treaty with Respect to Islands of Pa-
cific (particularly, Yap) February 11, 1922 July 13, 1922
Extension of Arbitration Convention August 23, 1923 April 26, 1924
Convention for Prevention of Liquor
Smuggling May 31, 1928 January 16, 1930
Income Tax on Shipping Profits 1926
Narcotic Drugs 1928
Passport Visa Fees 1926
Perpetual Leasehold 1937
In addition, Commodore Perry concluded a treaty with what was then known as
the "Kingdom of Lew Chew" (actually, the Ryukyu Islands, over which Japan
claimed hegemony) which was signed on July 11, 1854, and proclaimed on March
9, 1855.
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exempt from military service. With respect to freedom of commerce,
the treaty provided that:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting
Parties may trade in any part of the territories of the
other by wholesale or retail in all kinds of produce, manufactures,
and merchandise of lawful commerce, either in person or by
agents, singly or in partnership with foreigners or native citizens
or subjects; and they may there own or hire and occupy houses,
manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises which may be
necessary for them, and lease land for residential and commercial
purposes, conforming themselves to the laws, police and customs
regulations of the country like native citizens or subjects.3
None of these stipulations, however, would "in any way affect the
laws, ordinances and regulations with regard to trade, the immigra-
tion of laborers, police and public security which are in force or which
may hereafter be enacted in either of the two countries."4
During this same period, conventions were also successfully con-
cluded with respect to extradition and the reciprocal protection of
patents, trademarks, and copyrights.5
Upon the expiration of the Treaty of 1894, a new agreement was
reached in 1911. The provisions with respect to freedom of commerce
and navigation were generally repeated, but without the proviso men-
tioned above. A new provision was inserted, giving juridical persons,
organized in one country and domiciled in the other, the privilege "to
exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as plaintiffs or
defendants, subject to the laws of such other Party."6 The power of
either party to exclude such persons from doing business within the
territory of the other, however, was specifically recognized.
In view of the gradual deterioration of Japanese-American relations
during the nineteen twenties and thirties, it is not surprising that the
Treaty of 1911 was never renewed.7 Still, at the time of Pearl Harbor,
eleven agreements8 between the two nations remained in force.
Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 22, 1894, art. II, 29
STAT 848, T.S. No. 192.
4. I04.
S See rote 2 rpra.
Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, art. VII,
,7 STAT. 1504, T.S. No. 558.
See p. 157 bifra.
8 Agreements in force between the United States and Japan at the time of
'ea iI Harbor were as follows:
(i) Copyright Treaty of 1905(2) Extradition (1886) with Supplement (1906)
:*) Income Tax on Shipping Profits (1926)
(4) Narcotic Drugs (1928)(5} Passport and Visa Fees (1926)
((i) Perpetual Leaseholds (1937)(7) Shipwreck Expenses (1880)(8) Trade Mlarks in China (1908)(9)) Trade Marks in Korea (1908)
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The story of Japan's defeat and the subsequent seven-year occu-
pation need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that on September
8, 1951, a Treaty of Peace was signed between Japan and the Allied
Powers at San Francisco., At the same time, the United States and
Japan signed a security pact wherein Japan granted the United States
the right to station security forces in and about Japan.10 An admin-
istrative agreement under this security pact was concluded on Feb-
ruary 28, 1952. 1
With the conclusion of a Peace Treaty and an agreement whereby
the United States undertook the military defense of Japan, all that
remained to be done in order for the two nations to enter upon an era
of close harmony and cooperation was a new "Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation." Such a treaty was finally concluded on
April 2, 1953, and ratified by the United States Senate on July 21,
1953,12 just one hundred years after Commodore Perry's ships had
first appeared off the coast of Japan.
I. TREATY PROVISIONS
As might be expected, the problems of nationality and domicile
are not mentioned in the 1953 Treaty. The position and capacity of
aliens, however, are treated at some length. The alien is free to enter
for purposes of trade between the two countries, to tend to enterprises
in which he has invested, and for other purposes, subject to the law
governing aliens.13 Within the country, he may travel freely, reside
where he pleases, worship freely, and communicate generally both
within the country and abroad.14 The security of his person is guar-
anteed,15 and if arrested, he is assured of the fundamentals of pro-
cedural due process. 16 He has free access to the courts to protect his
rightslr and must be treated in the same way as a citizen so far as
workmen's compensation, social security, and unemployment insur-
ance are concerned. 8 His property is guaranteed protection, 1 and
(10) Treaty with Respect to the Islands of the Pacific, particularly the Island
of Yap (1922)(11) Exchange of notes declaring policy in the Far East (1908).
Of these agreements, the last four are no longer of any importance. The others
presumably remain in force.
9. Treaty of Peace With Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'L
AGREEMENTS 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490.
10. Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3
U.S. TREATIES & OTHER INT'IL AGREEMENTS 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 2491.
11. Administrative Agreement With Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, 3 U.S. TREATIES &
OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
12. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United
States and Japan, April 2, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
13. Id. art. I, § 1.
14. Id. art. I, § 2.
15. Id. art. II, § 1.
16. Id. art. II, § 2.
17. Id. art. IV, § 1.
18. Id. art. III.
19. Id. art. VI, § 1.
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he cannot be subjected to unreasonable search.2 0 If his property is
condemned by way of eminent domain, he is entitled to just com-
pensation.J' He is free to transmit his property within the country
without being subject to transit dues.-
In a few respects, the rights of the alien have been limited. Earlier
treaties exempted him from compulsory military service.2 3 In the
1953 Treaty, this provision has been omitted, possibly because of the
unwillingness of the United States Army to exempt aliens from the
draft, or possibly because Japan, under her "no-war" constitution,
theoretically has no army or navy.
As originally drafted, the treaty provided that the alien should
"not be barred from practicing the professions.., merely by reason
of [his] alienage. ' '24 The United States Senate, however, placed a
limitation on this section at the time of ratification:
Article VIII, paragraph 2, shall not extend to professions
which, because they involve the performance of functions in a
public capacity or in the interest of public health and safety,
are state-licensed and reserved by statute or constitution exclu-
sively to citizens of the country, and no most-favored-nation
clause in the said treaty shall apply to such professions.
2
5
The alien may acquire real property for residential or commercial
purposes, and is entitled to most-favored-nation treatment with re-
spect to the acquisition of personalty and disposition of property of
all kinds. ''
In the event that an alien should succeed to realty by way of testacy
or intestacy to which he cannot take title because of his alienage, he
is allowed five years to dispose of such property.2 7 Finally, it should
be noted that an alien is not permitted to engage in employment if
20, Id. art. TI, § 2.
21. 11. art. VI, § 3.
22. Id. art. XX.
23. Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 22, 1894, art. I, § 5,
29 STAT. 848, T.S. No. 192; Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the
United States and Japan, Feb. 21, 1911, art. I, § 4, 37 STAT. 1504, T.S. No. 558.
24. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United
States and Japan, April 2, 1953, art. VIII, § 2, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
25. Id. at p. 7. The limitation was necessary because of the fact that a number
of states bar aliens from the practice of law or medicine. It may be interesting
to note that there has recently been some discussion among the members of the
Japanese bar to the effect that admission to the bar should be limited to citizens
of Japan. At present, aliens may be admitted to the Japanese bar if capable of
passing the difficult bar examination (in Japanese). Mr. Thomas L. Blakemore, a
graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law, was the first Westerner
to successfully pass the examination. On the other hand, American lawyers who
are not admitted may represent foreign clients, and such attorneys are not at all
uncommon in the laige cities of Japan. The proposal would limit the practice of
foreign attorneys to the area of foreign trade.
This situation should be compared with the long-established system of reciproc-
ity between attorneys of Japan and the United Kingdom.
26. Id. art. IX, §§ 1, 2.
27. Id. art. IX, § 3.
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any such limitation is placed on him at the time of his admittance, 28
nor may he engage in any political activities. 21
It is apparent that the 1953 Treaty is not an all-inclusive statement
of the law of persons. To appreciate the large body of doctrine that
underlies this treaty, one must look to the municipal law of Japan
and the United States. The Japanese "Law Concerning the Appli-
cation of Laws in General"'30 and "Nationality Law"31 are particularly
important. American doctrines appear in a multitude of statutes and
cases, both state and federal. Moreover, the doctrines of constitu-
tional law play an important role in determining the rights of Japa-
nese persons within the borders of the United States.
II. NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP
Japanese doctrine makes no distinction between "nationality" and
"citizenship." What Americans commonly think of as a "citizen" is
translated as "national" in English translations of the Nationality
Law. An "alien" is defined as "one who is not a Japanese national."112
American doctrine, on the other hand, draws a distinction between
"national" and "citizen." While all American citizens are also Ameri-
can nationals, the reverse is not necessarily true. The term "national"
has been said to be "broader than 'citizen.' ,,33
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 defines a "national"
as a "person owing allegiance to a state. '34 An "alien" is defined as a
"person not a citizen or national of the United States."3 5 The term
28. Id. art. XXI, § 4.
29. Id. art. XXI, § 5.
30. Law Concerning the Application of Laws in General (H6REI), Law No. 10,
June 21, 1898, as amended by Law No. 7 of 1942, and Law No. 223 of 1947
(Japan), hereinafter cited as H6REI.
31. Law No. 147, May 4, 1950, repealing Law No. 66 of 1899, as amended by
Law No. 27 of 1916, Law No. 19 of 1924, Law No. 195 of 1947, and Law No. 239
of 1947 (Japan).
32. Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 3. Japanese doctrine does not have the concept
of a "national" who is not also a "citizen." Prior to World War II, nationality,
under Japanese law, was dependent upon blood, rather than domicile. Such a doc-
trine was feasible in a country with an extremely high percentage of racial homo-
geneity. Thus, a Korean domiciled in Japan might, in a few limited situations,
obtain Japanese nationality by naturalization.
After World War II, Japan amended its Nationality Law so that ethnic con-
siderations are no longer determinative. Anyone domiciled in Japan may now
become a Japanese national through naturalization, without regard to his racial
background. On the other hand, since Japan lost its overseas possessions as a
result of the war, there is presently no analogous area to which Japan might
apply the doctrine of collective naturalization, with the attendant concept of
nationality without citizenship, that characterizes American doctrine with refer-
ence to some of its overseas possessions.
It is interesting to note that the English language version of the 1953 Treaty
between Japan and the United States uses the term "national" whereas the 1894
and 1911 treaties (written, officially, only in English) used "citizen" or "subject."
33. Guessfeldt v. McGrath, 89 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1950).
34. 66 STAT. 169, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (21) (1952).
35. 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) (1952).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/1
JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS
"citizen" is not defined in the statute, but includes all nationals, ex-
cept those not specifically stated to be citizens.36
Nationality may be acquired in the United States either by birth37
or by naturalization. A person may be naturalized either by means
of a judicial proceeding,- or by way of collective naturalization." A
person who acquires his nationality either by birth or by way of in-
dividual naturalization also acquires citizenship, but one who acquires
nationality by collective naturalization acquires citizenship only if
extended at the time of naturalization, or by some later statute.
Today, the only American "nationals" who are not also citizens are
the inhabitants of American Samoa and the Swains Island.40
It has long been established that a person born of Japanese parents
domiciled in the United States is an American national and citizen
from birth,41 but it has only been since 1952 that a Japanese alien
could obtain American nationality and citizenship by way of indi-
vidual naturalization proceedings.4 2
Despite the specificity of the term "national" in the Immigration
and Nationality Act, its use remains ambiguous in other contexts.
Two cases involving the Trading with the Enemy Act illustrate the
difficulty of determining the meaning of the term "national" with
reference to persons of Japanese blood domiciled in the United States.
In one, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry was said not to be
a "national," while in the other, a Japanese alien was treated as a
"national."
In Okiharav . Clark,- the plaintiff sought to recover certain proper-
ties in Hawaii which had been transferred to her by her uncle, a Japa-
nese national domiciled in Japan. The transfer was made after the
effective date of the "Freeze Order" under the Trading with the
Enemy Act. The court held the attempted transfer void, and accord-
ingly the property was properly taken into custody by the Alien
Property Custodian.
3. 66 STAT. 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (1952).
:37. 63, STAT. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1952).
38. 66 STAT. 239, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-59 (1952).
39 . 66 STAT. 235, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1402-07 (1952) (codification of the provisions
with respect to the collective naturalization of American Indians and inhabitants
of outlying posessions).
40. Quacre the citizenship status of the inhabitants of the trusteed islands of
the Pacific and Okinawa. They have not been collectively naturalized by any
sovereignty.
41. Regan v. King, 49 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Cal. 1942).
42. Prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Japanese alien
was ineligible for naturalization by reason of his race. Ozawa v. United States,
260 U.S. 178 (1922). Section 1422 of the new act provides, in part, as follows:
"The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall
not be denied or abridged because of race or sex or because such person is mar-
ried." 66 STAT. 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952).
43. 71 F. Supp. 319 (D. Hawaii 1947).
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While not necessary to the decision of the case, the court commented
with reference to the plaintiff's citizenship:
But it is said-correctly-that plaintiff is a citizen of the
United States. True, but she is also a subject of Japan.... And
while for most purposes while in the United States a dual citizen
will be regarded as a United States citizen only, yet under an act
such as the Trading with the Enemy Act, its scope, purpose and
precise provisions require the consideration of realities as well.
This conclusion is no more unusual than the familiar one, also
dictated by this same Act, that a United States citizen resident
in an enemy country in time of war is an "enemy alien" even
though in fact he is neither an enemy nor an alien.44
Under the old Japanese Nationality Law, the plaintiff was a citizen
of Japan by virtue of having been born of Japanese parents. While
it was possible for her to renounce her Japanese citizenship, in all
probability she had failed to do so05 By way of contrast, since 1950,
Japanese law has required Americans of Japanese ancestry to take
positive steps to preserve their Japanese nationality.4
In Nagano v. McGrath,7 ' the plaintiff had emigrated from Japan to
the United States in 1915. Having acquired a domicile in this country,
she returned to Japan in 1924, and remained there until after World
War II, returning to the United States in 1950. Throughout her long
stay in Japan, plaintiff never voluntarily relinquished her domicile in
the United States.48 Accordingly, unless a Japanese "national" by
reason of her Japanese citizenship, she would be entitled to recover
certain property taken into custody by the Alien Property Custodian.
In holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that Congress had not intended
to "deprive friendly alien residents of all opportunity to recover un-
tainted American property, 4 9 'nd stated:
[T]hough literally speaking, plaintiff is a citizen of Japan, she
is not a citizen within the meaning of the word and its connota-
tion recognized by judicial decisions. We ordinarily think of a
citizen as one who owes allegiance to a state and has a reciprocal
right to protection by it. It is obvious that plaintiff, a loyal
44. Id. at 322.
45. Under pre-war Japanese law, it was necessary for an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry born before November 15, 1924, to make a renunciation of his
Japanese nationality. Failure to make such a renunciation meant that the indi.
vidual retained his Japanese nationality, although he was also an American citizen
by American doctrine. Law No. 66 of 1899, art. 20- (2) as amended (Japan),
cited note 31 supra. .
46. Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 9 (Japan).
47. 187 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1951).
48. Since the district court had dismissed plaintiff's petition as failing to state
a cause of action, the facts as alleged in her petition with reference to domicile
were taken as true for the purpose of her appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. While these facts were quite peculiar, if true they would amply justify
a finding that plaintiff had never given up her American domicile, despite her long
absence from this country.
49. 187 F.2d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 1951).
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American resident, unable to secure citizenship in this country,
on the averments of her complaint, owed no allegiance to Japan
and had no reciprocal rights to protection by it.... Her position,
we believe, is not within the conception of citizenship of a foreign
nation which Congress had in mind in defining a national00
III. DOMICIE
In American doctrine, domicile has been described as "the place with
which a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes,
either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned to
him by the law."'' The conventional American rule is that there are
three classes of domicile: domicile of origin,52 domicile of choice,53 and
domicile by operation of law, 1 and that every person can have one and
only one domicile2z Once acquired, a domicile continues until a new
one is obtained.- To establish a new domicile there must be an inten-
tion to abandon the old one, ' physical presence in the place where
domicile is alleged to have been acquired,5 and an intention to remain
there indefinitely.&,
"Domicile" should not be confused with "residence." Domicile has
acquired a technical meaning, while residence has many shades of
meaning, from mere temporary presence, to the most permanent type
of abode. As a statutory term, residence probably means domicile in
most cases, but its meaning in a legal phrase must be determined in
each case.""
Research reveals only one American case on domicile concerning
Japanese persons in the United States." Plaintiffs, American citizens
. o. It,5,,
)I. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 9 (1934). For a complete discussion of
the i ules concerning domicile, see 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 2 (1935) ; GOOD-
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAWs c. 2 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 9-41 (1934); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 2 (1937).
52. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14 (1934).
,13, ld. § 15.
54. Id. §§ 26-41. In at least four situations the law attributes domicile: (1)
Normally, the domicile of a married woman is the same as that of her husband.
But most courts in the United States will allow a wife to establish a separate
domicilo to sue for divorce. (2) A minor has the same domicile as that of his
father unless he is emancipated and has acquired a domicile of his own. If he has
been awarded to the custody of his mother, or is illegitimate, his domicile is that
of his mother. (3) An incompetent can change his domicile if he has sufficient
reason and understanding; otherwise, his domicile is the same as that of his
guardian. (4) A corporation is domiciled only in the state of incorporation.
55. RESTATEMIENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11 (1934). But see RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAws § 11, comment d at 53 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954), indicating
that domicile is not necessarily the same for all purposes; Reese, Does Domicil
Bear a Single Meaning?, COLurM. L. REv. 589 (1955).
57. RESTATEIMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 23 (1934).
7. 1d. § 18.
58. Id. § 16.
59. STMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 18-22 (1937).
60. For further discussion of domicile and its parallel, residence, see GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 2 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9,
comment e (1934).
G1. Hiramatsu v. Phillips, 50 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of Japanese ancestry, had been domiciled in California prior to being
moved to a relocation center in Arizona during World War I. They
brought an action against the defendant, a domiciliary of California,
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Cali-
fornia. The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that
there was no diversity of citizenship. In granting the motion, the
court found that the plaintiffs had no domicile in Arizona, since al-
though they asserted their intention to remain in that state, they had
not acquired a domicile of choice there.
The intention to acquire domicile of choice necessarily involves
an exercise of volition or freedom of choice not prescribed or
dictated by any external necessity. It is established law that a
person cannot acquire domicile by any act done under legal or
physical compulsion.62
It has been suggested that the court might have reached a different
result if the plaintiffs had demonstrated the good faith of their dec-
laration of intention not to return to California by showing that
they had obtained permission to leave the relocation center to move
inland, had obtained permanent employment, and were making their
new residence their home and center of affairs.63
In American law, the determination of domicile is, of course, of
great importance in cases of personal status, such as legitimacy, adop-
tion, marriage, divorce, custody, and the like. The disposition of per-
sonalty at death is largely controlled by the decedent's domicile. Ques-
tions of judicial jurisdiction and the jurisdiction to tax are likewise
dependent upon domicile for their doctrinal solution.
While Japanese law, since the abolition of extraterritoriality in
1894, is of territorial application insofar as jurisdictional matters are
concerned, choice of law is commonly governed by nationality, rather
than domicile.64 The law of the party's nationality is used to determine
such matters as capacity,65 incompetency,6 marriage,"' divorce,08 legit-
62. Id. at 168.
63. 42 MICH. L. REv. 321, 323 n.10 (1943).
64. For a more complete discussion of nationality and domicile, see Baty, Inter-
connection of Nationality and Domicile, 13 ILL. L. R-v. 363 (1919); 1 BFALE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 2 (3d ed. 1949);
WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7, 8, 34 (1905).
65. If an alien performs a juristic act in Japan, his capacity is determined by
Japanese law, even though he might be incapacitated by the law of his nationality.
Exceptions are made, however, in the case of the alien with respect to the doc-
trines of family law, succession, and real property outside Japan. In these mat-
ters, the law of his nationality governs. H6REI art. 3.
66. A Japanese forum may judge an alien domiciled in Japan incompetent for
any cause for which he would be deemed incompetent under the law of his nation-
ality, unless "such cause is not recognized by Japanese law." H6REI art. 4.
67. The capacity of the parties to enter into marriage is determined by the
law of the nationality. The validity of the marriage, insofar as it is dependent
upon form, is governed by the law of the place of formation. Legal relationships
and "arrangements relative to marital property" are governed by the law of the
nationality of the husband. HSREi arts. 13-15.
68. The law of the nationality of the husband is determinative of the grounds
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imation," , adoption, 7 the duty of support,71 guardianship,72 and suc-
cession."' If the individual has more than one nationality, then the law
of that country "whose nationality he last acquired" will be the ap-
plicable law, except that if one of these nationalities should be Japa-
nese, then Japanese law will be applied.7 4
Where the party has no nationality, the law of his domicile gov-
erns. If his domicile is unknown, then the law of his residence will be
followed." One of the most interesting provisions of Japanese conflicts
doctrine is a provision for "accepting the renvoi." 77 If, by Japanese
doctrine, the law of the place of nationality is to be followed, and such
law refers the court back to Japanese law, then "Japanese law shall
govern."
IV. ALIENAGE
While the 1953 Treaty guarantees the Japanese alien in the United
States many important rights, 7 such was not always the case. Indeed,
there were times in the history of the United States when the rights
of American citizens of Japanese ancestry, as well as the rights of
Japanese aliens, were completely ignored.
(a) The Privilege to Enter
The earliest Japanese visitors to American shores were a number
of scholars who managed to escape from Japan during the later days
of the Tokugawa shogunate government. After the restoration of the
Emperor to de facto, as well as de jure, power in 1868, the new gov-
ernment abandoned its two-century long seclusion policy and in 1885
removed barriers to labor emigration. Approximately one to two thou-
sand Japanese entered the United States or its possessions each year
which are available for divorce, but under Japanese conflicts rules such grounds
must also be available under Japanese law, i.e., the law of the forum. HaRms art.
16.
69. Legitimacy is determined by the "law of the country to which the husband
of the mother belonged" as of the time of the child's birth. 116REI art. 17. The
"conditions of acknowledgment" with respect to the father, mother, or child are
determined by the "law of the country to which [the father, mother, or child,
iespectivelyl belonged, at the time of acknowledgment." H6REI art. 18. Whether
the law of the country to which one belongs refers to nationality or domicile is
not clear; the validity of the acknowledgment is governed, however, by the law
of the nationality of the father or mother. HSREI art. 18.
70. The conditions of adoption are determined by the law of the nationality
of the party to be adopted; the validity of the adoption by the law of the na-
tionality of the adopting parent. H5REI art. 19.
71. H6REi art. 21 (law of the nationality of the person bound to furnish
support).
72. HREi art. 23 (law of the nationality of the ward).
73. H5REI art. 25 (law of the nationality of the "ancestor," i.e., decedent).
74, H5REI art. 27, para. 1.
75. H5REI art. 27, para. 2.
76, H5REi art. 27, para. 3.
77. H5REi art. 29.
78. See pp. 14849 supra.
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during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The vast majority
went to Hawaii to augment the labor supply in the sugar fields.
At the turn of the century, many Japanese began to settle on the
West Coast. One demographer has explained this occurrence as fol-
lows:
[T]he sharp rise in admissions to the mainland in 1900 reflects
a fortuitous diversion to San Francisco of Hawaiian-bound im-
migrants whose ships were turned away from Honolulu because
of an outbreak of bubonic plague in the Islands. Between 1901
and 1907, the curve of admissions ebbed to troughs of 4,000-5,000
and rose to a crest of almost 10,000, in response to the slackening
and quickening of the demand for labor on the West Coast, and
during these years. .. there was a striking covariation in curves
of immigration and of American business cycles. From 1908 on-
ward, however, the limits of fluctuation in admissions were set
primarily by political restrictions.7M
The influx of Japanese, as well as other immigrants, in the last
decade of the nineteenth century, prompted Congress to enact the
Immigration Act 0 to establish some qualitative control over persons
entering the United States. That the sovereign has the power to place
restrictions on the admission of aliens, or indeed to exclude them al-
together, cannot be doubted.81 But, once it has settled on a procedure
for the admission of aliens, such procedure must insure the alien fair
treatment. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 2 a Japanese im-
migrant was excluded from admission to the United States by the in-
spector of immigration as a "person likely to become a public charge."
Instead of taking an appeal from the finding of the local authority to
a higher administrative official, she sued out a writ of habeas corpus
in a circuit court of the United States. From a denial of the writ, she
appealed to the United States Supreme Court which held that the
determination of whether a particular immigrant fell within one of
the classes to be excluded under the statute was a matter for adminis-
trative determination, and that her sole appeal from an adverse ruling
was to higher administrative authority. Such appeal not having been
taken, the writ was properly denied by the circuit court. So long as
there was nothing to indicate that the administrative proceeding was
unfair, the petitioner had not been denied due process.
79. THOMAS, THE SALVAGE 6 (1952).
80. 26 STAT. 1084 (1891), 5 U.S.C. § 342(b) (1952). The first federal legisla-
tion concerning Asian immigration was enacted in 1875. 18 STAT. 477 (1875), 8
U.S.C. §§ 138, 336, 338-39 (1952). Prior to that time, some states had passed
acts affecting entry into their jurisdictions, but these state statutes were held
unconstitutional on the ground that the Constitution vested in Congress the ex-
clusive power to regulate immigration. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
81. See the recent case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S 580 587 (1952),
in which the Supreme Court, in reference to aliens, stated: "The dovernment's
power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court
since the question first arose."
82. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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Eleven years later, another Japanese immigrant sought by habeas
corpus to obtain judicial review of her detention by immigration of-
ficials prior to deportation. The Supreme Court again held that the
administrative determination that she came within one of the classes
excluded by the statute was conclusive, and that this was true even
though the immigrant's knowledge of English was not sufficient for
her to understand fully the administrative proceeding which deter-
mined that she could not be admitted. The Court pointed out that the
Treaty of 1894 did not give the petitioner any additional rights since
it specifically excepted any laws relating to "police and public secur-
ity," and the Immigration Act of 1891 was properly includible within
this category."'
The continuing increase in the number of Japanese coming into
California eventually caused persons on the West Coast to bring pres-
sure on President Theodore Roosevelt to put an end to Japanese im-
migration. *' Through diplomatic negotiations, the United States and
Japan reached a "Gentlemen's Agreement" whereby Japan would con-
fine the emigration of laborers from Japan to the United States to
"those previously domiciled in the United States, or parents, wives,
or children under twenty years of age of such persons."' 5 The terms
of this agreement became the basis upon which "picture brides '86 were
brought from Japan to the United States between 1907 and 1924.
In 1911, the two nations entered into a new treaty to supplant the
earlier Treaty of 1894 which had expired. Despite the terms of the
treaty which provided that the "citizens ... of the High Contracting
Parties shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories
of the other to carry on trade," 87 Congress eventually succumbed to
the pressures of West Coast racism, and enacted a statute providing
for the complete exclusion of the Japanese.Is
After World War II, the immigration rules with respect to Japanese
aliens were finally modified. At first, brides and fiances of service-
8: .Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
84. See the San Francisco School Board's Resolution of 1906, requiring Orien-
tals to attend segregated schools. Roosevelt finally persuaded the Board to re-
scind the resolution on the basis of a promise to "bring Japanese immigration to
an end." Buell, Japanese Immigration, in 7 WORLD PEWE FOUNDATION PAmPH-
LETS, Nos. 5-6, at 287.
85. Letter from Ambassador Hanihara to Secretary of State Hughes, April 10,
1924, quoted in BUELL, op. cit. supra note 84, at 359.
8(.The term "kekkon shashin" arose from the custom of Japanese alien bach-
elors domiciled in the United States exchanging photographs with potential brides
in Japan. After a marriage by proxy, the bride could then emigrate to the United
States and the bachelor was spared the expense of a trip to Japan to obtain a
wife. See THOMAS, op. cit. su8pra note 79, at 7, 8.
87. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between the United States and Japan,
Feb. 21, 1911, art. I, 37 STAT. 1504, T.S. No. 558.
88. Section 13 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 STAT. 153, provided that
"No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United States."
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men and bridegrooms and fianc6s of servicewomen were admitted
without regard to their racial origin. 9 Finally, in 1952, Congress
abolished race as a criterion for exclusion. 0
Since 1952, Japanese aliens may be admitted to the United States
as either immigrants or non-immigrants. The immigrant classification
is further subdivided into quota and non-quota immigrants. At pres-
ent, 185 persons may be admitted each year as quota immigrants
from Japan.9 1 Within this quota, four categories are designated as
having preference: (1) certain skilled workers, (2) parents of Amer-
ican citizens, (3) spouses and children of aliens admitted for perma-
nent residence, and (4) certain close relations of American citizens.92
Non-quota immigrants include the following: (1) spouses and chil-
dren of American citizens, (2) re-entering alien residents, (3) natives
of the Western Hemisphere, (4) certain expatriated former citizens,
(5) ministers of religious denominations, and (6) certain alien em-
ployees of the United States Government missions abroad."
Non-immigrants are divided into the following classes: (1) officials
of foreign governments, (2) temporary visitors, (3) transient aliens,
(4) crewmen, (5) treaty traders or investors, (6) students, (7) in-
ternational organizations personnel, (8) temporary workers, and (9)
foreign correspondents. 4
(b) The Privilege of Naturalization
Prior to 1952, it was impossible for an alien Japanese to become a
citizen of the United States. In Ozawa v. United States,9 a Japanese
alien sought to obtain naturalization on the theory that the Natural-
ization Act of 1906 in no way limited the privilege of obtaining citi-
zenship to persons of a particular race. The act simply stated that
an "alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States in
the following manner, and not otherwise."' 9 The petitioner contended
that so long as he fulfilled the requirements of the 1906 statute, he was
entitled to become a naturalized citizen. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the Act of 1906 was limited by section 2169 of the Revised
Statutes which restricted naturalization to members of the white and
89. 59 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U.S.C. §§ 232-37 (1952); 60 STAT. 339 (1946), 50
U.S.C. § 1851 (1952).
90. Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 STAT. 166 (1952); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
503 (1952).
91. Proc. No. 2980, 17 FED. REG. 6019 (1952).
92. 66 STAT. 178, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1952).
93. 66 STAT. 167, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (1952).
94. 66 STAT. 166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (15) (1952).
95. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
96. Rnv. STAT. § 2169 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1952).
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African races. Since the petitioner did not fall within either of these
categories he was ineligible for citizenship.5 '
In striking contrast with the earlier attitude, the 1952 Act specif-
ically provides that "the right of a person to become a naturalized
citizen of the United States shall not be denied or abridged because of
race."" Accordingly, if a Japanese alien can satisfy the other require-
ments of the statute,"" he can now become a citizen.
(c) The Right to Work
Every state in the Union, as well as the District of Columbia, has
local legislation limiting the occupations in which an alien may seek
employment.' , These local laws, placing restrictions on every conceiv-
able occupation from architecture to wrestling promotion, are found
mostly in the professional fields and in public health.'" The elimina-
tion of aliens from certain fields of endeavor has been justified on the
ground that where a particular line of work affects the public in-
uT. A similar result was reached with reference to a Japanese alien who
servd in the American armed forces. The Court held that the words "any alien,"
as u ,ed in a statute providing for the naturalization of those who had had military
rrvtce, 40 STAT. 547 (1918), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1952), and Act of July 19, 1919, c.
24, 41 ST.xT. 222', were limited by Rrv. STAT. § 2169 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 703 (1952),
so as to confine these words to the races therein specified. Toyota v. United States,
286 U.S. 492 (1952). See also Yamashita v. Hinkle, 260 U.S. 199 (1922) (natu-
ralzation certificate issued to a Japanese alien void on its face).
98, 66 STAT. 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952).
9t1. The requirements are as follows:
1. Lawful admission for permanent residence.
Z. Understanding the English language and the fundamentals of the his-
tory, principles, and form of government of the United States.
3, Attachment to the principles of the Constitution and a disposition to
the good order and happiness of the United States.
4, Good moral character.
Continuous residence (i.e., domicile) for 5 years in the United States,
including at least 2% years of physical presence in the United States, and 6
months of living in the state where the petition for naturalization is filed.
The abiove requirements are modified in the case of former citizens, spouses and
children of citizens, aliens with service in the armed forces, alien seamen, and per-
sons performing religious duties abroad. See 66 STAT. 239, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1423-40(a) (1952).
A recent statute prevents loss of American citizenship by reason of voting inany itolitical election in Japan during the period of the American occupation(Septc'mher '2, 1945-April 27, 1952). 88 STAT. 495 (1954). 8 U.S.C. § 1428
(Supp. II, 1955). Such a statute was necessary to protect Nisei who voted in
such elections to encourage the development of democracy in Japan during thepost-war period.
I 09,. For a fuller discussion of the alien's "right to work," see KONvrrz, TanALIEN AND THE ASIATI in Anrican LAW c. 8 (1946); Chamberlain, Aliens and
the Rght to W~ork, 18 A.B.A.J. 379 (1932 FeIman, The Alien's Right to Work,
22 Minn. L. Buy. 137 (1938) ; O'Connor, (Jonstitutionasl Protection of the AIen'sRigh t to W~ork, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. B. 483 (1941); Note, 49 Cowsr. L. Rug. 257
(1949) ; Comment, 52 Milca. L. Rsv. 1184 (1954).191. For a compilation of state legislation, see KONVzTz, Tan Araxw AN THE
Aswnc iN A SICa N LAW 190-211 (1946); 5 V(n6, A berai F, Aln LaWS
295;402 (1938); Note, 53 HAt L. RE. 112 (1939).
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terest, a classification based on the distinction between aliens and
citizens is not unreasonable. 0 2
Until 1952, however, it was impossible for a Japanese alien to be-
come a citizen. As a result, the statute which prevented aliens from
entering a particular activity had a highly discriminatory effect
against the alien Japanese. Moreover, local law was occasionally
worded so as to prohibit "ineligible aliens" from various occupations.
In an earlier day, the Japanese alien obtained some protection by
means of treaty provisions. In AsaLkura v. City of Seattle,103 the Su-
preme Court struck down a municipal ordinance limiting issuance
of pawnbrokers' licenses to citizens only, as being in conflict with
the 1911 Treaty between the United States and Japan. After World
War II, the Supreme Court ruled against local legislation directed
against "ineligible aliens."
In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,04 the Court held that
a California statute prohibiting the issuance of commercial fishing
licenses to any "person ineligible for citizenship" constituted a viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
the federal civil rights statutes.10 5
Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, noted the obvious truth
that the California statute was specifically directed against Japanese
aliens:
We should not blink at the fact that § 990, as now written, is a
discriminatory piece of legislation having no relation whatever
to any constitutionally cognizable interest of California. It was
drawn against a background of racial and economic tension. It
is directed in spirit and in effect solely against aliens of Japanese
birth. It denies them commercial fishing rights not because they
threaten the success of any conservation program, not because
their fishing activities constitute a clear and present danger to the
welfare of California or of the nation, but only because they are
of Japanese stock, a stock which has had the misfortune to arouse
antagonism among certain powerful interests. We need but un-
button the seemingly innocent words of § 990 to discover be-
neath them the very negation of all the ideals of the equal pro-
tection clause. 106
Since a Japanese alien is no longer ineligible for citizenship, local
statutes drawn in the manner of the statute in the Takahashi case
can no longer operate in such a discriminatory fashion. Moreover, the
102. See, e.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (New York statute pro-
hibiting employment of aliens on pulblic works and giving preference to citizens
of New York for employment upheld); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S: 138
(1914) (Pennsylvania statute barring aliens from hunting wild game upheld);
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (Virginia law prohibiting citizens of
other states from planting oysters in a Virginia tidewater river upheld).
103. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
104. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
105. 16 STAT. 140, 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952).
106. 334 U.S. 410, 427 (1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/1
JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS
Japanese alien may now become a naturalized citizen so as to be eligi-
ble to enter a profession from which he might otherwise be barred
by reason of his alienage.
(d) The Right to Hold Property
During the second and third decades of the twentieth century, the
West Coast states inaugurated a campaign to deny the Japanese alien
the right to hold property for agricultural purposes.or Although the
United States Supreme Court upheld the alien land laws,1 these
statutes actually had little effect in eliminating the Japanese alien
from the agricultural scene. It has been pointed out that :1
Strict enforcement of the land laws would have driven the Japa-
nese back to the status of laborers or out of agriculture altogether,
for the vast majority of tenants and owners were foreign born,
and their American-born children were still too young to exercise
citizenship rights. But these laws were inherently difficult to en-
force, and they were extensively, continuously, and collusively
evaded. Farms were bought or operated by aliens who acted as
guardians of their minor American-born children;""O land was
leased under names "borrowed" from older Japanese-American
citizens; and corporations were formed for the sole purpose of
undercover leasing of land." Tenants sought legal refuge by
assuming the permissible status of farm managers, foremen, and
laborers. In these and other evasive practices the Japanese had
the active cooperation of the many Caucasian ranchers, shippers,
and merchants to whom their tenancy was profitable and ex-
pedient.V '
107. See the following California statutes: Cal. Stats. 1913, c. 113, at 206;
Cal, Stats. 1923, c. 441, at 1020; Cal. Stats. 1927, c. 528 at 880- Cal. Stats. 1943,
c, 1003, at 2917, c. 1059, at 2999; Cal. Stats. 1945, c. 112, at 2164; CaL Stats. 1951
cx 171 4, at 4035; Cal. Stats. 1953, c. 1816, at 3600. The statutes commonly denied
the right to hold property to "aliens ineligible for citizenship," and excepted land
held for purposes "prescribed by any treaty." Two treaties gave Japanese aliens
in the United States the right to hold property for "residential or commercial pur-
poses." Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 22, 1894, art. II,
2i Snt. 848, T.8. No. 192; Treaty With Japan on Commerce and Navigation,
Feb. 21, 1911, art. 1, 37 STAT. 1504, T.S. No. 558. See also Jordan v. Tashiro, 278
U.S. 123 (1928) (construction of treaty as being confined to strictly commercial
and residential purposes held unwarranted).
I(I8. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923) (California statute); Terrace
v, Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (Washington statute).
10a. TaonAs, THE SAxvAG 24 (1952). The original footnotes in the quotation
have been deleted.
110. See e.g., In the Matter of Yano, 188 CaL 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922)(guardianship for purposes of holding minor's title held valid).
11i. See, e.g., Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923), where the application
of the statute so as to prohibit an arrangement whereby a Japanese aien had
a "cropping" contract with a year lease was held not to violate any constitutional
right of the alien. Similarly, in Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923), the Court
upheld the California Alien Land Law as applied to the sale of stock in a land
corporation. gut see In -re Okahara, 191 Cal. 353, 216 Pac. 614 (1923) (cropping
contract held not within Alien Land Law).
112. See, e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925) (upholding conviction
of Caucasian for conspiracy to violate alien land laws).
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Recently, in Oyama v. California,7 the Supreme Court was pre-
sented with an opportunity to hold the alien land laws unconstitutional.
An alien Japanese had taken title to agricultural land in the name of
his son, a minor American citizen. The father was appointed guardian
for the son, but failed to file the annual guardianship reports required
of guardians of agricultural land belonging to minor children of in-
eligible aliens. The state brought escheat proceedings to recover the
land on the ground that it had been acquired with the intention of
evading the California Alien Land Law. Under the local statute, the
son had the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption that the
conveyance was with intent to evade escheat of the land. This in-
ference was presumed from the fact that an ineligible alien had paid
the consideration, and title had been taken in the name of a minor.
Rather than overrule its earlier decisions in the alien land cases,
the Court struck down the statute on the ground that it denied the son,
an American citizen, equal protection of the laws, by placing on him
a burden of proof that was not placed upon other California minors.11
Four of the justices"15 concurred with the result, but felt that the pre-
vious decisions of the Court should have been overruled and the alien
land laws declared unconstitutional.
Four years after the decision in the Oyama case, the California
Supreme Court, relying on the Oyama and Takahashi cases, ruled that
the California Alien Land Law was unconstitutional because it vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.11
Oregon and Montana have also found their alien land laws to be viola-
tive of the equal protection clause.31 While the alien land laws of
other West Coast states have not been invalidated, they have been
mooted by the abolition of the distinction between eligible and ineligi-
ble aliens.
113. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
114. The opinion of the Court represented the views of Chief Justice Vinson,
who wrote the opinion, and three of the associate justices (Reed Frankfurter,
and Burton). Justice Jackson agreed with the majority opinion that it was not
necessary to decide the constitutionality of the alien land laws to dispose of the
case, but felt that the Court should not, while conceding "the state's right to
keep the policy [of the statute] on its books . . . strip the State of the right to
make its Act effective." Id. at 688 (dissenting opinion).
115. Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge (concurring opinions by Black
and Murphy). Id. at 647, 650.
116. Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). The case is interesting
from several points of view, other than the constitutional question, viz., (1) the
unsuccessful attempt to use the United Nations charter as a basis for outlawing
the alien land laws, and (2) the large collection of sociological data with respect
to the position of persons of Japanese ancestry domiciled in the United States.
See especially the concurring opinion of Judge Carter. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 738, 242
P.2d 617, 630 (1952).
117. State v. Oakland, 287 P.2d 39 (Mont. 1955); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore.
579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
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(e) The Relocation Program
Perhaps the blackest mark in the history of American democracy
was the relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific
Coast to the interior during World War II. While the program was
foisted on the people of the United States as one of "military neces-
sity," careful post-war studies have shown that it was nothing more
than a way of articulating and implementing the racist thinking of a
minority of persons in power in the West Coast states."'$ The lack of
military necessity for such a program was demonstrated by the fact
that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, much closer to the war front,
were never evacuated. Moreover, the federal government had no dif-
ficulty in rounding up espionage agents, saboteurs, and the like, even
prior to relocation.
Unfortunately for the history of civil liberties, the United States
Supreme Court took the attitude that the war power overrode the
usual constitutional rights of citizens (to say nothing of aliens), and
that the question of military necessity was for military judgment and
not subject to judicial review. In 1943, it sustained a curfew order,
issued by the commanding general of the Western Defense Command,
directing all persons of Japanese ancestry to remain in their homes
from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.""
By October 1944, when the constitutionality of the evacuation pro-
gram was argued, a Japanese-American unit in Italy was fast becom-
ing the most decorated unit in the history of the United States Army,
the Marianas Islands had been secured, and the invasion of the Philip-
pines was under way. A courageous Court would have welcomed an
opportunity to rule the entire program unconstitutional, and prevent
the establishment of a precedent that constitutional rights of citizens,
as well as aliens, can be ignored in war.
118. A large amount of non-legal materials are available for the study of
various facets of the relocation problem. BLOOI & RIEATER, REMOVAL AND RETURN
(1949) is a detailed study of the socio-economic effects of the war on Japanese-
Americans domiciled in Los Angeles County. GRODZINS, AiMERICANS BETRAYED
(1949) traces regional pressures and how they were brought to bear on the in-
struments of national policy. THOMAS & NISHImOTO, THE SPOILAGE (1946) is
the hest study of the actual evacuation and resettlement. THOMIAS, THE SALVAGE
(1952) is largely a collection of individual experiences of Japanese-Americans,
describing the effects of the program on their lives. These materials uniformly
demonstrate that the program was an expression of racism.
Some of the earlier legal materials sought to justify the evacuation on the
giounds of military necessity and precedent upholding the program. See, e.g.,
Alexandre, Tie Nisei-A Ca. ualty of World War If, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 385 (1943) ;
Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 HARv. L.
14n. 1253 (1942); Wolfson, Leqal Doctrine, War Power, and Japanese Evacua-
tion, :2 KY. L.J. 328 (1944). But later writing uniformly condemned the pro-
gram. See, e.g., Dembitz, Racial Discrbmination and the Military Judgment, 45
CoLTi. L. RmV. 175 (1945) ; Freeman, Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus-Genealogy,
Eraactf' n, and Laws, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 414 (1943); Rostow, The Japanese
A merica,1 Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945).
119. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Yasui v. United States,
320 U.S. 115 (1943).
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But on the day after the Western Defense Command rescinded its
exclusion orders, the Court held that the war-time relocation of Ameri-
can citizens of Japanese ancestry in no way violated their constitu-
tional rights.- °
One student of the program has summed up the tragedy of these
cases as follows:
Japanese-Americans were the immediate yictims of the evacua-
tion. But larger consequences are carried by the American people
as a whole. Their legacy is the lasting one of precedent and con-
stitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under mili-
tary auspices. This is the most important result of the process
by which the evacuation decision was made. That process be-
trayed all Americans.121
(f) Marriage
Eleven states still have miscegenation statutes prohibiting the mar-
riage of white persons and "Mongolians.' '12  Prior to 1948, the con-
stitutionality of such statutes was generally conceded. But in that
year, the Supreme Court of California struck down a California
statute which provided that a marriage license could not be issued
to a white person who sought to marry a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian,
or member of the Malay race. 2 3
While the miscegenation statutes, like the alien land laws, may
eventually be declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court," 2 4 until that time the marriage of a white person and a person
of Japanese ancestry will cause a number of problems.2s Most of the
120. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215 (1944). In another case de-
cided the same day, the Court, without considering the constitutional questions
involved, held that the War Relocation Authority had no authority to subject
"concededly loyal" American citizens of Japanese ancestry to its leave procedure.
Ex, parte Endo, 823 U.S. 283 (1944). The WRA abandoned its leave procedures
on the same day that this decision was rendered.
121. GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETAYED 374 (1949).
122. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-107 (Supp. 1951) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 53-106 (1937);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-206 (1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 459 (1942); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 451.020 (Vernon 1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-103 (1943); NEv. Co MP.
LAws § 10197 (1929); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(6) (1953); VA. CODE § 20-54(1950); WYo. COMP. STAT. § 50-108 (1945). Montana and Oregon have repealed
their miscegenation statutes which were directed, in part, against the marriage
of whites and orientals. California has declared its miscegenation statute, CAL.
CiV. CODE § 69 (1949), having similar provisions, unconstitutional. Perez v. Sharp,
32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
123. Perez v. Sharp, supra note 122.
124. The Court may get its first opportunity to so rule in the recent case of
Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955). Certiorari was granted in
this case, but in a per curiam decision the Supreme Court ruled that the failure
of the parties to present all the relevant questions prevented a ruling on the
constitutional validity of the Virginia miscegenation statute. The judgment
below was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 350 U.S.
891 (1955).
125. Despite legislative attempts to deter mixed blood marriages, they none-
theless occur, creating countless other legal problems such as legitimation, in-
testacy, divorce, duty of support, etc. See, e.g., In re Takahashi's Estate, 113
Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942).
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states which prohibit mixed blood marriages also provide that domicil-
iaries cannot circumvent their miscegenation statutes by means of
an out-of-state marriage which would be valid in the state where the
marriage is performed. To date, like most of the miscegenation laws,
the latter type of statute has not been held unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, Japanese nationals in the United States and Ameri-
can nationals in Japan have come to enjoy practically all the rights
and privileges available to nationals domiciled in their respective home
countries. Discrimination against the Japanese alien with regard to
employment, acquisition of property, marriage, entry, and naturaliza-
tion has been eliminated in the United States. The modification of the
Nationality Law in Japan to place a greater emphasis on domicile for
naturalization purposes has had the effect of broadening the class of
persons who may seek Japanese citizenship. Americans are generally
free to enter, marry, acquire property, and pursue an occupation, on
much the same terms as the Japanese. Most of these privileges are
further reinforced by specific provisions in the recent "Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation."
Differences remain in the conflict of laws between the two countries
insofar as choice of law is concerned. American doctrine emphasizes
domicile, while Japanese law looks to nationality as its principal tool
for the solution of conflicts cases. As more cases are litigated, many
of the doubtful questions in this field will be resolved. In the mean-
time, the close associations of our two countries, as a result of the
present world situation, will continue to make this small corner of the
law of conflicts a peculiarly important area.
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